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> Tbls paper has two purposes. First. to explore what existing adoption 
legislation may indicate about the meaning and function of adoption 
practices in North America and Great Britain. Second. to consider some 
possible policy implications revealed by clearer understanding of the 
sodal meaning of existing adoption laws. The first part of the paper 
summarizes briefly the history of legal adoption. The second examines 
what is explicitly and implicitly revealed by adoption law and policies 
about the social purposes of adoption and about prevailing social values 
concerning the family. The third part examines possible avenues of policy 
change in North America. 
HISTORICAL REFERENCE POINTS 
Adoption, in some of its forms. is probably as old as the family itself. 
Among the ancient Greeks and Romans. adoption enabled ancestral 
worship by a son-priest when no son was born (de Coulanges, 1873). 
'1'bere the practice also served as a means for protecting the family's status 
and material wealth. In medieval Japan. adoption served the feudal 
warrior caste in expanding their fiefdoms and in making alliances (Kirk. 
19Mb, 1971). Given such social purposes. formal adoptions were 
restricted to males, either as children or as adults. Among the Inuit 
. peoples of North America. adoption has long been practised as a means 
or mutual aid among isolated bands living in a harsh climate (Boas, 
1888). The prevalence of adoption in many preliterate societies has been 
~ed as basic to the understanding of family structure (Lowie. 1930; 
' "lllO, 1936; Weckler. 1953). 
Although adoption patterns. in ancient or preliterate societies. typically 
rec::etved traditional sanction. most notably religious. the function of these 
• ~_~ revised version of a paper prepared for presentation at the Canadian Sociology and 
t ~Iogy Association meeting, June 1982. Ottawa. 
t....w..:_or La~. U,niversity of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada and Department of 
* 0;;:' Uruverslty or Waterloo, Waterloo. Ontario. Canada. 
nt of Sociology. University of Waterloo, Waterloo. Ontario. Canada. 
76 H. David Kirk and Susan A. McDaniel 
patterns was principally to serve the social, political and economic 
interests of kin groups, rather than the interests of the adopted. It is in 
this that there exists a main difference between all previous and modern 
adoption practices. In addition to social interests, modern adoption is to 
protect the interests of the children being adopted. Thus the first law not 
based on Roman precedents, enacted in Massachusetts in 1851, explicitly 
purported to protect the interest of the adopted child. Similar legislation 
was first introduced in Canada in New Brunswick in 1873. 
The State's increasing involvement in adoption through legislation was 
undoubtedly not wholly altruistic. The enunciation of the' best interest 
of the child' principle served equally the interest of the State. By checking 
to see that only responsible people were given parental rights through 
adoption, financial responsibility for the care of dependent children could 
be most effectively transferred from the public purse to the private. That 
the State's interest was thus intertwined with concern for the dependent 
child is shown by the following: to this day the investigations of 
applicants as fit for adoptive parenthood are typically limited to circum-
stances in which no existing kinship ties are involved. It is apparently 
assumed that where kindred are involved the State can more justifiably 
remove itself from financial responsibility. 
Perhaps for a similar mixture of altruistic and financial reasons, 
adoption laws have increasingly sought to equate the adoptive family 
with its consanguine counterpart. For instance, the legal regulation of 
in testate inheri tance has in North American jurisdictions almost uniformly 
separated the adopted from the estates of blood kindred. Simultaneously 
it has more unequivocally placed the adopted into the circle of the 
adoptive family. The issuance of amended birth certificates, giving the 
adoptee an identity with the surname of the adoptive parents, provided 
a further symbolic separation from the old and linkage to the new kin 
group. Such legal and policy arrangements have served to institutionalize 
adoption and thereby to legitimate the adoptive family in the eyes of the 
public. But to this, largely positive, result of legal adoption 'in the best 
interests of the child' were added policies and procedures with less 
beneficial consequences. Since most adoptions in which the State inter-
vened were at first of children born out of wedlock, and since this was 
in an era of prejudice against illegitimacy, the child's interest was seen 
to lie in erasing this stigma. Upon adoption the amended birth certificate 
was to erase the natural parent(s) from the adopted person's vital records. 
Furthermore, original birth records were typically sealed and available 
only with a court order. When in many jurisdictions the original parent's 
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JDStltutionally invisible. If the intent of law and policy was to make it 
IDdlstinguishable from its consanguine counterpart. the adoptive family 
bad virtUally succeeded in its mimicry. That this mimicry was not wholly 
In the best interest of the adopted child. or indeed in the interest of the 
society which had sought to so define adoption. will be indicated below. 
ADOPTION LAWS AND POLICIES ON TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC 
In this section of our paper we must take a closer look at the social values 
that have been institutionally built into adoptive kinship. We shall try 
to show that as an artifically contrived family form it is intended both 
to mimic certain idealized images of the mainstream family and to prop 
up the idealization. We believe that an inspection of the legalistic creation 
of adoptive kinship can reveal our collective hopes for the traditional 
family. At the same time such an inspection should reveal certain 
drawbacks: when the differences between consanguineal and adoptive 
kinship are being institutionally extinguished. this tends to obscure the 
unique characteristics of the adoptive family. both good and less good. 
Our inspection will follow cross-cultural lines. Such an analysis should 
reveal issues that often remain hidden when examining a single society. 
As is often the case in social history. a sharp change can reveal more 
about a society's institutions than long periods without change. Such a 
sharp change occurred in Great Britain in 1975 with the passage into 
law of an act which permitted adult adoptees access to their original birth 
certificates (Kirk. 1981). Adoption has only a fifty year legal history in 
Great Britain. while in North America its history is three times longer. 
What does the British reform legislation of 1975 reveal about the 
institution of adoptive kinship. about traditional family values. and about 
their linkage? More specifically. how do we understand the fact that the 
refonn of adoptive kinship came about in Great Britain so comparatively 
soon. when in North America with its much longer history of legal 
adoption. it has not happened? 
By way of explanation. Kirk (1981. pp.139-41) suggests that Great 
Britain has retained a greater sense of its own culture and way of life 
over time than have Canada or the United States. both of which have 
experienced more heterogeneity. This has served. to some extent. to 
insulate Britain against the deteriorating authority of the family. a 
process already well underway in the nineteenth century on both sides 
of the Atlantic. In North America. the cultural response to weakening 
kinship ties and authority. by contrast. has been to hark back to the 
earlier days of the traditional family. All manner of solutions have been 
proposed. from increased religious participation to the outlawing of fast 
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food franchises, in order to stem the erosion of nostalgically-idealized 
family values. Of these attempts only the artificially contrived. adoptive, 
family has come to serve as an effective prop, if not a restoration, of 
traditional family values, This propping up of values that are not as 
clearly in evidence in the mainstream family does not necessarily stem 
from the internal dynamics of adoptive family relationships. Instead, it 
is engendered by the limits which adoption law and policy in North 
America have placed on the participants. 
In North American jurisdictions the doctrine of adoptive kinship as the 
equivalent of the consanguineal family rests on legal and policy 
restrictions. Aided by institutionally altered birth certificates and the 
removal of the original ones from all eyes except those of the registrar 
of vital statistics, it is not only the birthparents who are, properly enough, 
denied access to the child they have surrendered for adoption. The 
adoptee, at whatever age, long after legal maturity is reached. is refused 
access to original birth records and thus to proper knowledge of his/her 
roots. All the members, but especially the adoptees. are locked into a 
model of the family which is more characteristic of the idealized television 
family, the Waltons, than of any contemporary consanguine family. In 
this way. the institution of adoptive kinship in North America enshrines 
an anachronistic image of the family, nostalgically regarded as the core 
of true and good family organization and relationships. When a member 
is not free to leave, that member's staying put may be taken as loyalty, 
but it is at best a case of pseudo-loyalty. The adoptee is not • free to leave' 
the confines of the adoptive identity to discover whatever may lie back 
of it. The North American insistence on the' equivalence doctrine' tends 
to imprison the adopted person as adult in the same mechanisms which 
were devised for his or her benefit as child. That is one of the ironies of 
the creative invention of modern adoption as it is almost everywhere 
maintained in Canadian and American jurisdictions. 
In Great Britain. in contrast, adoptive kinship has now been recognized 
as a unique family form. one which need not prop up nostalgic family 
values and can be openly acknowledged as different. The opening of 
original birth records. while this did not take place without debate and 
discomfort. appears to us then as indicative of a society surer of its past 
and less in need of idealized culture images and values. In that sense the 
meanings of 'family'. including the meanings attached to adoption, may 
be closer to the reality of everyday life in Great Britain than on the North 
American continent. If the equivalence doctrine is to be sustained in law 
and in policy it means that a cultural hoax is being institutionally 
enforced. Changes in the pattern of North American adoption, especially 
I, 
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the kind of children available and becoming adopted, have however made 
dis doctrine increasingly irrational and untenable. 
The equivalence doctrine of adoptive kinship becomes most clearly 
visible as a cultural hoax when there are profound discrepances between 
expected and actual events in the overt aspects of a family's life. When 
native and other non-white children become' adoptable' by whites, the 
ramllies so constituted are clearly • different', a trend which Hepworth 
notes is on the increase (1980, pp.164-6). When older children, and even 
seriously handicapped children, become candidates for the permanency 
of adoption, the resulting families are likewise visibly . different'. Such 
changes have for some years been part of the North American adoption 
pattern. In such situations, no amount of institutional authority and 
legitimation. and no amount of genuine love and acceptance by adoptive 
parents. will make the child indistinguishable from other children born 
to these parents or to their neighbours. The public awareness of the child's 
dUrerence will make it virtually impossible to sever all links with the 
ethnic past, even if, as is sometimes the case. the child is taken to another 
country. For an older child. with a memory of former homes and . 
relationships, the attempts by parents to erase the past will be experienced 
as a farce or an insult. 
What is especially ironic is that in adoption there resides a remarkably 
creative potential. both for the substitute family itself, and for the larger 
numbers of the mainstream family. It is evidently just when differences 
are being candidly and lovingly acknowledged between adoptive parents 
BOd children, that there emerges between them the strongest bonds of 
solidarity (Kirk, 1964a, pp.82-99; 1981. 39-54). Such a finding heralds 
a hopeful future for an increasing multiplicity of. and heterogeneity in, 
family patterns. The adoptive family tends to be voluntaristic. people 
drawn together out of need rather than by a predetermined biological 
division oflabour based on age and sex. In that sense the adoptive family 
may be regarded less as a marginal than as a prototypical pattern: it may 
be the harbinger of a more widespread family formation by choice within 
1be mainstream of the society. Recognition of the duality of one's roots 
-biolOgical and social- may presage the more comfortable acceptance 
of evolving family forms. In the more ordinary sense it implies the 
!rtlmation of the rising tide of step-family life. preferably without the 
too frequent recourse to legal adoption. In the more futuristic realm. 
the discovery of candidness as a basis for solidarity in adoptive kinship. 
lilly P<>sslbly pave the way for honesty in lieu of the subterfuge of secrecy :ntly in VOgue among professionals practising artificial insemination 
• donor sperm, and so-called surrogate motherhood. 
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There is yet another irony in the archaic restrictions of North American \. 
adoptions laws and policies. If they are meant to remind people of the 
traditional virtues of familism they are especially miscast. for a new wave 
of familial values appears to be forming everywhere. Thus the growing 
tendency for single mothers. both never married and divorced. to keep 
their babies (Hepworth. 1980. p.178). which accounts in part for the 
dearth of healthy white infants available for adoption. may represent a 
reassertion of the primacy of familial ties in a troubled and uncertain 
world. Those nostalgic for the traditional family might not recognize the 
old drives in the newer tendencies. In other ways. as well. the mainstream 
family may be in the process of reasserting needs and values which had 
not been given recognition by the Walton-like cultural ideal. Among these 
values being rediscovered are the desire for true human sharing. and not 
being stifled by a traditional division of labour. along lines of gender or 
age. These values have more naturally been sought in adoptive kinship. 
out of the dire necessity for sharing. since it has had to manage without 
biological division of labour. 
SOME POLICY IMPLICA TIONS 
A basic issue in need of consideration in the future is the internally 
contradictory nature of adoption law and policy in North America. On 
the one hand it seeks to promote familial values. but it does so by 
inhibiting the voluntary character of these values when applied to the 
adoptive family. New laws and policies would recognize the complexities 
of adoptive kinship and the need for special attention to the life histories 
of adoptees. This would require not only greater flexibility than is allowed 
under existing adoption law but an overt recognition of the social 
purposes and functions being served by the institutionalized adoptive 
kinship system that has been constructed. 
At the centre of our policy critique is the equivalence doctrine. It is the 
cause of much that makes for problems in adoption. This is most 
poignantly demonstrated in the adoptive parent-child relationship itself. 
Policies on adoption have encouraged adoptive parents to tell their 
adopted child at an early age that he/she is adopted. This process. no 
matter how lovingly undertaken. is bound to be filled with hurt and 
self-doubt for both parent and child (Kirk. 1964a. pp.36-49). As noted 
above. the adoptive parents' acknowledgement of difference of their own 
situation enlarges their capacity for empathy with the child's situation. 
and so facilitates open communication on these issues between child and 
parent. When adopters reject their own difference as parents while they 
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try to tell the child about his/her difference through adoption it adds to 
the child's confusion and self-doubt. But that is precisely what the 
contradictory nature of adoption currently encourages. On the one hand 
the policy urges that the child be told of adoption. while on the other hand 
it encourages the adopters to lean on the equivalence doctrine. which 
Implies that there is no difference. 
Further to the equivalence doctrine: what family type is taken as the 
model for adoptive kinship to simulate? Our inspection of the restrictions 
Inherent in current North American adoption policies has suggested an 
answer. These restrictions point to a cultural ideal of the family that is 
both archaic and improbable. Except for laws that specify an adult's duty 
to support aged and indigent parents. the sons and daughters in 
mainstream families are not coerced into loyalty to parents or other 
kindred. That is. however. what the adoption laws and policies of most 
North American jurisdictions now seek to enforce. The adoptee remains 
a dependant for life. institutionally tied down. But this coercion is effected 
not by the mores of powerful extended kin groups. as it is in traditional 
societies. but by the State power as the surrogate of a Grossfamilie that 
no longer wields any real power. The model which underlies the 
equivalence doctrine refers therefore to a family that is archaic and 
Improbable; it does not correspond to family forms or behaviour 
requirements that make sense in our time and place. 
The realities of family and kinship are quite different from the 
television image projected by the Waltons. That false front does not hide 
the pervading instability of marriage. consequent custody and child 
support disputes. and such indigenous 'solutions' as child kidnapping by 
estranged parents. If' the Waltons' model of the family is to be rejected 
for adoptive kinship. what is to take its place? Our answer is best given 
by setting the issue on its head. Instead of an archaic image serving as 
model for the adoptive family. we shall propose that certain intrinsic 
characteristics of adoptive kinship serve as the model for the mainstream 
famtly. FollOWing Kirk (1981) we shall refer to this model as the 'shared 
fate' model. In the context of adoptive parent-child relations the concept 
or · shared fate' implies that the adopters make themselves available to 
the child in his/her painful search for an understanding of having been 
liven up. In a larger context ' shared fate' denotes mutual aid for mutual 
Deeds. It is a term that suggests creative attempts at brave human coping 
:: .the ~any uncertainties and dilemmas that typically result from 
tic SOCial change (Kirk. 1964c. pp.2S8-9). Once that model takes the 
IJIace of the Wahons model. not only for adoption but for a wider variety 
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of childrearing and child care patterns, it becomes possible to formulate 
corollary policies. We shall formulate three such corollary policies here; 
there may of course be others. 
Corollary 1 : Once there is an alternative cultural model of the' shared 
fate' type, it becomes easier to make the adoptive family a discrete and 
unique, rather than a catch-all, category of kinship. Thus, a • shared fate' 
family model makes it possible to remove the label of • illegitimacy' from 
the single family household with an unmarried parent and her or his 
child. It will no longer be necessary to resort to the legal subterfuge of 
legitimating the child through adoption. Similarly, it should be quite 
unnecessary for a step-parent to resort to legal adoption as a device of 
affirming his or her position in loco parentis. Instead, as in British practice, 
the step-parent can be directed to an alternative device, namely that of 
guardianship. 
Corollary 2: Once the . shared fate' model has replaced that of the 
Waltons, it should no longer be necessary for the State authorities to look 
to adoption as a magic formula for solving all residual child care issues. 
They will no longer be so ready to regard adoptive placements as the least 
harmful solution for the child and the least expensive for the State. When 
thinking about the needs of older children, of handicapped, or of 
ethnically disadvantaged ones, and about the costs involved, the' shared 
fate' model will now open new vistas. It will then be easier to be 
innovative, at least to the extent of developing more appropriate child care 
arrangements out of older, long-discarded forms. Take for instance the 
orphanage: like the earlier almshouse, it served as a device for removing 
unwanted children from the public scene. Orphanages - yes, they were 
frequently more damaging than helpful to the children. Nevertheless, it 
may be worth our while to reconsider a total condemnation. Could some 
part be salvaged? Let us put to use the . shared fate' model in trying to 
answer. Group homes have for some years been used where foster homes , 
or adoptive families could not be found or seemed unsuitable. After World 
War II several countries in Europe experimented with children's villages 
to take care of the large numbers of homeless youngsters without family • 
supports. At a time in our history when large numbers of older but still 
active people are made useless by retirement, and when unemployment 
has disconnected large numbers of younger adults from productive 
endeavours, why is this reservoir of human beings not creatively combed 
and partially redirected into the care of children? It is our view that by 
re-defining the model ofthe family in . shared fate' terms we may discover 
avenues to family renewal that will not require the slavish adherence ~ 
the nuclear family model, a model which can, under the best 0 
circumstances, only serve a limited number of children. 
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Corollary 3: The socio-linguistics of adoption draw attention to the easy 
and frequent exchange of the terms' fostering' and • adopting'. For some 
tiIne the child welfare professionals made a case for distinguishing 
between these two forms of . substitute' parenting. But long-term foster 
care, and the more recent practice of subsidizing adoptions have served 
to undermine the distinction. Be re-defining the adoptive family as 
'different', the less readily valued foster family can gain in respect and 
dignity. 
As policies concerned with adoption are re-examined, the relationship 
between foster care and adoption must receive closer attention. In the 
case of foster care, the principle of the best interests of the child often 
takes a secondary role to saving increasingly scarce child welfare 
resources. Except in the relatively unusual conditions of State subsidies 
for adoption, current interpretation of adoption laws makes the adopted 
child the sole responsibility of the adoptive parents. This freeing of the 
State from any further financial liability may become a ready incentive 
to encourage adoption. This, however, may not be in the best interests 
or any of the parties involved, particularly if the child is older and has 
strong attachments to natural parents or to foster parents with whom 
long years of childhood may have been lived. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the light of the foregoing, we believe that the best interests of children, 
or parents, and of the community will be promoted by a re-definition of 
adoptive kinship and the reconstruction of the laws and policies regulating 
adoption. Instead of being seen as the equivalent of an archaic ideal. 
adoptive kinship can be seen as a unique family form. Once no longer 
expected to serve as a reminder of archaic family forms and virtues, 
adoptive kinship can be freeing rather than confining. Adult adoptees can 
be freed from State-imposed fetters, while the State's representatives -
legislators, judges and social service personnel- are freed from obligations 
to sustain myths which contradict everyday experience. 
The reform of adoptive kinship is not, however, advanced by certain 
devices that are currently in vogue in some North American jurisdictions. 
Voluntary registers, such as those of Ontario, New Brunswick and 
Manitoba, are not ways of securing the voluntarism and freedom of 
adults to discover their own biological roots. That is so especially when ::ech registers require the consensus of adoptive parents, at whatever age 
adult adoptee may be when undertaking his or her quest. 
~ ~975 reforms instituted by the Children Act in Britain should be 
ctive for Canadians and Americans facing the challenge to rethink 
adoption law, policy and practice. First, this statute calls into question 
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the equivalence doctrine, raising the possibility of the emergence of a 
truly innovative and fundamentally different form of family. Second, the 
British Act recognized the problems inherent in remarriage and step-
parenting. In background research to the Act, the damaging possibilities 
of step-parent adoption, without careful consideration. was recognized. 
It was suggested that becoming a • half-parent' might be preferred to a 
complete legal displacement of the natural parent. an action which could 
be ultimately harmful to both the parent involved and to the child. 
Much remains to be done on this side of the Atlantic. Our task is not 
made easier by insufficient and unreliable statistical information on the 
numbers and kinds of adoptions arranged in the different jurisdictions 
(Hemphill. McDaniel & Kirk. 1981). Also. we have to consider five dozen 
provincial and State legislatures. each of which makes its own laws and 
shapes its own policies with respect to adoption. Perhaps we in Canada. 
being between the United States and Great Britain in our history and our 
outlook. can more readily invoke the British precedent toward the reform 
of adoption law and policy. 
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